Atypical emotional anticipation in high-functioning autism by Palumbo, Letizia et al.
Palumbo et al. Molecular Autism  (2015) 6:47 
DOI 10.1186/s13229-015-0039-7RESEARCH Open AccessAtypical emotional anticipation in
high-functioning autism
Letizia Palumbo1*, Hollie G. Burnett2 and Tjeerd Jellema3Abstract
Background: Understanding and anticipating others’ mental or emotional states relies on the processing of social
cues, such as dynamic facial expressions. Individuals with high-functioning autism (HFA) may process these cues
differently from individuals with typical development (TD) and purportedly use a ‘mechanistic’ rather than a
‘mentalistic’ approach, involving rule- and contingency-based interpretations of the stimuli. The study primarily
aimed at examining whether the judgments of facial expressions made by individuals with TD and HFA would be
similarly affected by the immediately preceding dynamic perceptual history of that face. A second aim was to
explore possible differences in the mechanisms underpinning the perceptual judgments in the two groups.
Methods: Twenty-two adults with HFA and with TD, matched for age, gender and IQ, were tested in three
experiments in which dynamic, ‘ecologically valid’ offsets of happy and angry facial expressions were presented.
Participants evaluated the expression depicted in the last frame of the video clip by using a 5-point scale ranging
from slightly angry via neutral to slightly happy. Specific experimental manipulations prior to the final facial
expression of the video clip allowed examining contributions of bottom-up mechanisms (sequential contrast/
context effects and representational momentum) and a top-down mechanism (emotional anticipation) to
distortions in the perception of the final expression.
Results: In experiment 1, the two groups showed a very similar perceptual bias for the final expression of joy-to-neutral
and anger-to-neutral videos (overshoot bias). In experiment 2, a change in the actor’s identity during the clip removed
the bias in the TD group, but not in the HFA group. In experiment 3, neutral-to-joy/anger-to-neutral sequences generated
an undershoot bias (opposite to the overshoot) in the TD group, whereas no bias was observed in the HFA group.
Conclusions: We argue that in TD individuals the perceptual judgments of other’s facial expressions were underpinned
by an automatic emotional anticipation mechanism. In contrast, HFA individuals were primarily influenced by visual
features, most notably the contrast between the start and end expressions, or pattern extrapolation. We critically discuss
the proposition that automatic emotional anticipation may be induced by motor simulation of the perceived dynamic
facial expressions and discuss its implications for autism.
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The ability to interpret social cues conveyed by an agent as
reflecting the agent’s mental or emotional state, allowing
the observer to anticipate the agent’s behaviour, is essential
for successful social interactions. In contrast to individuals
with typical development (TD), individuals with autism
spectrum disorders (ASD) are thought to have difficulties
with this skill, or at least with its spontaneous employment
[1, 2]. ASD is a pervasive developmental condition charac-
terized by impaired social development and stereotypical,
repetitive behaviours, which are often accompanied by
obsessive interests and a lack of empathy [3–5]. High-
functioning autism (HFA) is a mild form of autism with
normal intelligence quotient (IQ) distribution, but with a
delayed development of language skills and difficulties in
social and emotional domains [6].
The extent to which atypical social and emotional
behaviour in individuals with HFA reflects an impaired
ability for implicit (automatic, non-volitional) rather
than explicit (inferential, volitional, involving awareness)
understanding is still unclear [7, 8]. Traditionally, the
emphasis has been on explicit deficits in social under-
standing, such as the failure to attribute epistemic men-
tal states (such as beliefs and desires) to others [9–11] or
on failures in executive functioning [12]. However, more
recently, impairments in implicit social processing
increasingly gained attention, with suggestions that they
may form a primary deficit [1, 2]. A failure in implicit or
automatic understanding may be (partly) compensated
by explicit reasoning on the basis of contextual informa-
tion [2, 13].
A primary source of information on the basis of which
implicit mental and emotional attributions can be formed
is action sequences, either consisting of limb/body articula-
tions or of changing facial expressions [14–16]. In humans,
the perception of such simple actions, and indeed even
single frames taken from the action sequence, has been
shown to activate (pre)motor areas that are also involved in
the execution of these actions, both with respect to limb
actions [17] and facial expressions [18–21]. The matching
of observation and execution of actions at the level of indi-
vidual cells has been referred to as the mirror neuron
mechanism (MNM) [22, 23]. The MNM may enable an
automatic motor simulation of the observed action, which
resembles the neuronal activity when the observer carries
out the observed action him/herself. This may provide the
observer with an appreciation of the other’s action ‘from
within’, i.e. from a first person perspective rather than from
a third person perspective [24]. Importantly, the motor
simulation might additionally provide the observer with an
automatic anticipation of what the other’s most likely next
action or goal is. In other words, it may provide a view into
the immediate future, on the basis of the immediate past.
This idea is closely linked to the notion that actionrepresentations are neurologically arranged in action chains
[15, 16, 25], where the chain specifies a goal. The automatic
unfolding of the chain activity enables the automatic antici-
pation of the other’s next action or state of mind [26].
It is still much debated whether individuals with HFA
have difficulties with action anticipation and whether this
may be underpinned by impaired motor simulation. Diffi-
culties in anticipating others’ actions in HFA have recently
been suggested [27, 28]. Impaired motor simulation in ASD
has been reported [29] but has also been contested [30].
Using perceptual distortions to study emotional
anticipation
The anticipation of actions consisting of dynamic facial
expressions has recently been studied through a new task,
which, in TD individuals, creates robust distortions in the
perception of other’s facial expressions that are presumably
due to anticipatory processes [31, 32]. This task involved
the perception of short video clips of ‘ecologically valid’
dynamic facial expressions [33], in which intense happy or
angry facial expressions morphed rapidly into neutral
expressions (happy and angry offsets). The perceptual his-
tories biased the evaluation of the neutral expressions, such
that following a happy offset the neutral expression was
evaluated as slightly angry, and following an angry offset as
slightly happy. This was called an ‘overshoot’ response bias,
involving a crossing of the category boundary. A series of
manipulations were applied in order to clarify the nature of
this bias [32]. For example, a change of facial identity just
before the final neutral expression removed the overshoot
bias [32]. This ruled out a major contribution of relatively
low-level visual processes such as (sequential) contrast
effects [34–36], adaptation [37, 38] and representational
momentum (RM) [33, 39]. Sequential contrast/context
effects were ruled out because the identity change did not
alter the degree of contrast in emotion between the first
and last expressions. Thus, if contrast was the driving force
behind the overshoot bias, then the bias should not have
been removed by the identity-change manipulation. After-
effects induced by adaption to the initial facial expression
(presented for 300 ms) were ruled out as they typically
generalize across different identities. An explanation in
terms of RM, which is the phenomenon that an observer’s
memory for the final position of a moving target is dis-
placed further along the observed trajectory, was also
deemed unlikely. RM, when applied to dynamic facial ex-
pressions, could in principle operate on two distinct
levels: (1) The level of dynamic geometrical facial fea-
tures (e.g. the U shape of the mouth in a smile turning
flat and moving into a reversed U shape). The changes
in the facial expressions when going from one identity
to the other are smooth enough not to disturb or reset
RM. Indeed, when the identity transition was made
really smooth by using morphing procedures [32], the
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identity-change condition; (2) The level of an underlying
valence dimension (a positive to negative dimension in
the joy-to-neutral condition, and a negative to positive
dimension in the anger-to-neutral condition). However,
the valence does not depend on the identity but on the
expression, and therefore an identity change should not
diminish RM.
Thus, extrapolations on both levels are unlikely explana-
tions for the overshoot bias as neither should be affected by
an identity change.
On the basis of these findings, the authors suggested
that ‘emotional anticipation’, which is the involuntary
and automatic anticipation of the other’s emotional
state of mind on the basis of the immediate percep-
tual history, better explained the results. Emotional
anticipation can be seen as a low-level mind-reading
mechanism, enabling the tacit and intuitive under-
standing of another’s emotional state of mind [8].
Thus, in the joy-to-neutral videos, the observer impli-
citly anticipated the agent’s emotional state of mind
to move into a ‘negative’ state, and in the anger-to-
neutral videos to move into a ‘positive’ state. The idea
is that these implicit ‘mentalizing’ activities in turn in-
fluenced perception [40].
The current study
The current study explores the issue of whether emo-
tion anticipation is impaired in HFA by utilizing the
above paradigm [32]. The reasoning was that if individ-
uals with HFA are impaired in the involuntary and
automatic anticipation of the direction into which an-
other’s emotional state develops, on the basis of the im-
mediate dynamic perceptual history, then they would
not report the visual distortion found in TD individ-
uals. A number of experimental manipulations were
introduced to examine whether the mechanisms under-
pinning perceptual report by the HFA group might be
any different from those in the TD group. Individuals
with HFA have been reported to use alternative or
compensatory strategies, which may rely on physical orTable 1 Demographic information for the HFA group and the TD g
Group n Age Sex AQ
Exp 1 HFA 16 20.3 (3.2) 5 F; 11 M 32.1 (7
TD 18 20.1 (4.0) 7 F; 11 M 15.3 (5
Exp 2 HFA 17 22.1 (7.2) 5 F; 12 M 29.0 (8
TD 17 22.1 (5.5) 6 F; 11 M 15.5 (6
Exp 3 HFA 15 22.3 (7.1) 5 F; 10 M 33.7 (5
TD 19 20.6 (2.5) 6 F; 13 M 14.7 (6
HFA and TD group characteristics in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Age is in years. Standa
F female, M male, AQ Autism Spectrum Quotient, IQ-T total IQ score, IQ-V verbal IQ
Observation Scheduledynamical characteristics of the stimulus [27, 41]. In
principle, any aberrant perceptual report in the HFA in-
dividuals might be due to either an over-reliance on
contrast effects or RM, or to impaired emotional antici-
pation. The experimental manipulations were specific-
ally designed to disentangle these mechanisms.
Experiment 1
Short video clips of dynamic facial expressions, which
morphed from 100 % joy or 100 % anger to either a neutral
expression, a 10 % joy or a 10 % anger expression [32], were
presented to the HFA and TD groups to assess any differ-
ences in their perceptual report of the facial expression dis-
played in the final frame. The primary hypothesis was that
the individuals with HFA do not engage in ‘emotional an-
ticipation’, which should result in the absence of an over-
shoot response bias. Alternatively, on the basis of findings
suggesting that individuals with HFA can anticipate some-
one else’s actions by using alternative, compensatory strat-
egies [27], it might be that they do show an overshoot bias




Seventeen students with HFA participated in experi-
ment 1. These formed a subset of the total of 22 in-
dividuals with HFA who took part in the three
experiments comprising this study. The composition
of the HFA groups differed slightly per experiment;
group demographics are given for each experiment
separately in Table 1.
The following description applies to all 22 HFA indi-
viduals. They all had previously received a diagnosis of
HFA or Asperger syndrome from a clinical psychologist
or psychiatrist based on DSM-IV-TR [42] or ICD-10 [4]
criteria. All were recruited through disability services
from universities in the north-east of England (UK). Evi-
dence of diagnostic history for ASD was acquired, and
in order to confirm ASD symptomology, the ADOS
(Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, module 4)roup
IQ-TOT IQ-V IQ-P ADOS
.4) 117.1 (10.9) 119.9 (14.7) 111.4 (14.7) 8.0 (0.9)
.2) 113.4 (8.3) 114.1 (7.6) 111.8 (11.6)
.2) 115.9 (8.1) 117.2 (13.2) 112.1 (15.0) 8.1 (0.9)
.6) 114.5 (7.7) 116.6 (6.4) 112.6 (12.6)
.7) 118.9 (8.9) 121.6 (13.6) 112.3 (11.9) 8.2 (1.6)
.1) 114.7 (7.5) 115.5 (7.4) 112.5 (10.8)
rd deviations are shown between brackets
score, IQ-P performance IQ score, ADOS Autism Diagnostic
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ADOS is a semi-structured, standardized assessment of
communication, social interaction and imagination, de-
signed for use with children and adults suspected of hav-
ing ASD [43]. A score of 7–9 indicates autism spectrum,
and a score of 10 or more indicates autism. The 22 indi-
viduals included in the study all met the ADOS criteria
for HFA or Asperger syndrome (of the initial group,
three individuals were excluded for having ADOS scores
below 7). They also all completed the Autism Spectrum
Quotient questionnaire (AQ) [44], which is a 50-
statement, self-administered questionnaire, designed to
measure the degree to which an adult with normal
intelligence possesses autistic-like traits.
From the 17 students with HFA participating in
experiment 1, one was removed following the applica-
tion of exclusion criteria to the data (see ‘Data reduction’
below for details). The remaining 16 students (5 females,
11 males; mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 3.2) had a mean
total ADOS score of 8.0 (SD = 0.9) and a mean AQ
score of 32.1 (SD = 7.4). Their mean total IQ score was
117.1 (SD = 10.9; Table 1), assessed using the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS-III [45].
TD group
All TD participants in the three experiments were
undergraduate psychology students from Hull Univer-
sity. None of them took part in more than one experi-
ment. All were asked if they had previously obtained a
head injury or had received a diagnosis of ASD or of an-
other mental health or developmental disorder. No par-
ticipants disclosed this. Twenty TD individuals took part
in experiment 1; applying the exclusion criteria to the
data (see ‘Data reduction’ below) removed two individ-
uals. The remaining 18 participants (7 females, 11 males;
mean = 20.1 years, SD = 4.0) had a mean AQ score of
15.3 (SD = 5.2) and a mean total IQ score of 113.4 (SD =
8.3). The TD group did not differ from the HFA group in
terms of age (t(32) = .554, p = .583), gender ratio (X2(1,
33) = .216, p = .642) or IQ (t(32) = −1.14, p = .264). As ex-
pected, AQ scores were significantly higher in the HFA
group (t(32) = −7.74, p < .0001).
An important feature of the study was that the HFA
group could be matched very closely with the control
TD group, as both groups consisted of university stu-
dents with fairly similar daily routines, resulting in a
good approximation of the influence of the factor ‘HFA’.
All HFA and TD participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and provided written consent prior to
the experiment. Participants received course credits or a
fee for taking part. The study was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychology of Hull
University.Materials
The stimuli and experimental procedure were the same as
in [32]. Pictures of eight actors displaying facial expres-
sions of joy and anger were selected from the Pictures of
Facial Affect (four males: EM, JJ, PE, WF; four females: C,
MO, PF, SW) [46]. All faces were shown from frontal view
with their eye gaze directed straight ahead. The photo-
graphs were in grayscale. The hair had been blackened so
as to merge with the black background. The pictures were
digitally adjusted to match in contrast and brightness. The
eyes of all actors were positioned at approximately the
same screen location. Faces measured about 13 × 20 cm
when displayed on the screen, subtending approximately
8° vertically.
Nine interpolated images, in between the full-blown
expression of joy or anger (which is called 100 %) and
the neutral expression (0 %), were created at equal steps
of 10 % intensity change, using computer morphing pro-
cedures [47]. The resulting video clips depicted a max-
imally happy or angry expression of which the intensity
gradually decreased until a neutral, a 10 % joy or a 10 %
anger expression was reached. The first and the last
frames each lasted 300 ms. The nine interpolated frames
each lasted 30 ms (9 × 30 = 270 ms). The clips were 30
ms longer or shorter in case of 10 % intensity endpoints
(Fig. 1).
Procedure
The experiment started with a calibration condition, in
which the eight stimulus faces showed static neutral expres-
sions (i.e. neutral expressions according to the ratings from
[46]). Sixteen calibration trials were presented (eight actors,
two repetitions each; random order) in which the neutral
face was shown for 600 ms (preceded by a 500-ms fixation
cross). Participants were prompted to rate the ‘neutral’ ex-
pressions using a 5-point scale, ranging from slightly angry
(1) via neutral (3) to slightly happy (5), by pressing one of
five labelled keys on a button box (SR-Box, Psychology Soft-
ware Tools, Inc., USA).
Following the instructions displayed on the screen,
eight practice trials were presented, in order to make
sure that participants did understand the instructions
and also to make them familiar with the task. The
practice was followed by 64 experimental trials. Each
trial started with a fixation cross (500 ms), directly
followed by a video clip. As soon as the video ended, a
blank screen appeared with a prompt to provide a re-
sponse. The participant’s task was to evaluate the last
expression using the same 5-point scale as used for
the calibration trials. The 64 experimental trials were
presented randomized, half of them starting with a
happy expression (called joy-to-‘neutral’ videos) and
half with an angry expression (called anger-to-‘neutral’
videos). Of both types of videos, 50 % of trials ended
Fig. 1 Illustration of the stimulus presentations in experiment 1.
Joy-to-‘neutral’ videos started with a facial expression of intense joy,
which gradually morphed into a 10 % joy, a neutral or a 10 % anger
expression (top panel). Anger-to-‘neutral’ videos started with a facial
expression of intense anger, which gradually morphed into a 10 %
anger, a neutral or a 10 % joy expression (bottom panel)
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10 % joy and 25 % of trials with 10 % anger expres-
sions. The duration of the entire experimental proced-
ure was 20 min.
Data reduction
Trials in which Reaction Times (RTs) were below 250
ms or above 3000 ms were considered outliers and were
removed (HFA, 3.8 %; TD, 2.9 %). Participants were ex-
cluded if more than 25 % of their RT values fell outside
the above range (HFA, n = 0; TD, n = 1) and when they
pressed the same key for more than 90 % of trials (HFA,
n = 0; TD, n = 0). A ±2.5 SD rule was applied to the
mean difference of the ratings per participant, i.e. rating
in the anger-to-neutral condition minus rating in the
joy-to-neutral condition (HFA, n = 1; TD, n = 1).For both groups, the mean calibration scores obtained for
each of the eight stimulus faces were used to adjust the
scores in the experimental trials; a calibration factor [equal
to 3.00 minus the calibration score] was added to the ex-
perimental scores. The calibration procedure allowed per-
forming one-sample t tests with test value 3.00 on the
scores in the two perceptual histories. All statistical analyses
were performed on the calibrated scores.
Results
An illustration of the scores in the calibration phase for
the neutral expressions of each actor in the TD and HFA
groups is shown in Fig. 2. The calibration scores were
similar between the two groups, with the neutral expres-
sion of actors C and WF consistently rated as slightly
angry.
The results of the experimental trials are illustrated
in Fig. 3. A 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was
performed with the endpoint of the video (10 % anger
vs. neutral vs 10 % joy) and perceptual history (joy-
to-'neutral' videos vs. anger-to-'neutral' videos), and
group as between-subjects factor (HFA vs. TD). The
main effect of endpoint was significant (F(2, 64) = 43.9,
p < .0001, ηp
2 = .58), reflecting that when the videos
ended at 10 % joy, the expressions in the last frame were
judged as more happy than when they ended at neutral
(t(15) = −4.14, p = .001) or at 10 % anger (t(15) = 4.54,
p < .001), while the 10 % anger and neutral endpoints
did not differ from each other (t(15) = 2.50, p = .024;
α = .017 after correction for multiple comparisons).
The main effect of perceptual history was significant
(F(1, 32) = 223.8, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .88), reflecting that
the final expressions were judged as more angry in the
joy-to-neutral condition than in the anger-to-neutral
condition. There was no significant main effect of
group (F(1, 32) = 2.1, p = .15, ηp
2 = .063).
The endpoint by group interaction was non-significant
(F(2, 64) = .94, p = .40, ηp
2 = .029), nor was the percep-
tual history by group interaction (F(1, 32) = 3.3, p =
.078, ηp
2 = .095). The endpoint by perceptual history
interaction was significant (F(2, 64) = 4.1, p = .021, ηp
2 =
.11), reflecting that across both groups the difference
between the judgments in the two perceptual histories
at the 10 % joy endpoint was larger than at the neutral
(t(33) = 2.7, p = .030) and 10 % anger (t(33) = 2.6, p = .013)
endpoints. The three-way interaction was non-significant
(F(2, 64) = .063, p = .94, ηp
2 = .002).
The judgments made at the neutral video endpoint were
examined in more detail, as this endpoint, due to being nei-
ther positive nor negative, is most sensitive to a misattribu-
tion of emotional content involving a crossing of the
category boundary. In the HFA group, the mean ratings in
the joy-to-neutral videos (M = 2.73, SD = 0.22) and anger-
to-neutral videos (M = 3.21, SD = 0.28) differed
Fig. 2 Calibration scores in experiment 1. Ratings on the 5-point scale (vertical axis) for the neutral expression. Scores are shown for each of the
eight actors for HFA (top panel) and TD individuals (bottom panel). Error bars indicate +1SD
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each of them differed significantly from 3.00 (joy video, p <
.0001; anger video, p = .010). The TD group showed a very
similar pattern; the mean ratings in the joy-to-neutral
videos (M = 2.71, SD = 0.27) and anger-to-neutral
videos (M = 3.36, SD = 0.31) differed significantly
from each other (t(17) = −7.04, p < .0001), and each
of them differed significantly from 3.00 (joy video, p <
.001; anger video, p < .0001).
Discussion
Both HFA and TD participants showed a robust overshoot
response bias, with the last expression of the joy-to-neutral
videos evaluated as slightly angry and the identical lastexpression of the anger-to-neutral videos evaluated as
slightly happy. The main conclusion is that the evaluations
of both groups were influenced by the perceptual histories,
and to roughly the same extent (with a tendency for the TD
group to be influenced more than the HFA group). The re-
sults seem to be in line with a study by [48] who reported
that a group of individuals with developmental pervasive
disorders overestimated the intensity of facial expressions
in neutral-to-emotional expression video clips similar to a
TD group, although to a lesser extent.
If the HFA group had shown no overshoot bias, then that
would have suggested that they do not engage in an ‘emo-
tional anticipation’ process. The presence of the overshoot
bias leaves open two possibilities: (1) the HFA group
Fig. 3 Results of experiment 1. a Ratings on the 5-point scale for the expressions depicted in the last frame of the joy-to-‘neutral’ and anger-to-‘neutral’
videos for the HFA group (left side) and the TD group (right side). The sequences ended at 10 % anger, neutral or 10 % joy. Error bars indicate 1SD. b Ratings
for exclusively the neutral expressions at the end of the happy and angry videos for the HFA and TD groups. Scores are shown for each of the eight actors
to illustrate consistency
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TD group, and (2) they rely on another mechanism, which
compensates for the absence of automatic emotional antici-
pation. Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted to clarify this
issue. Specifically, they examined whether individuals with
HFA may have processed the dynamic facial expressions
predominantly in terms of physical characteristics, without
keeping track of the changes in the agent’s emotional state
of mind that cause the changes in facial expression.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted to test whether low-level vis-
ual mechanisms, underpinning contrast and RM effects,
may explain the overshoot effect found in experiment 1 in
the HFA group. Hereto, the identity of the actor was chan-
ged in the last frame of the clips, similar to the manipula-
tion performed in [32]. Thus, participants needed to judge
the last expression of the videos depicting a new identity
for which no immediate perceptual history was available.
The rational was that if the overshoot bias in HFA individ-
uals resulted from sequential contrast effects or from RM
operating on an underlying positive–negative valencedimension, rather than from emotional anticipation, then a
change in identity should have no effect. A change in the
agent’s identity does not affect the contrast between the
first and last frames nor does it interfere with the under-
lying positive–negative valence dimension. On the other
hand, if the bias in the HFA group did result from emo-
tional anticipation, then they should, similar to the TD
group in [32], not show an overshoot response bias. After
all, one cannot anticipate the emotional state of someone




HFA group Twenty individuals with HFA took part in
experiment 2, of which three were removed following the
application of data exclusion criteria (see ‘Data reduction’
below). The remaining 17 individuals (5 females, 12 males;
mean age = 22.1 years, SD = 7.2) had a mean total ADOS
score of 8.1 (SD = 0.9) and a mean AQ score of 29.0 (SD =
8.2). Their mean total IQ score was 115.9 (SD = 8.1;
WAIS-III; Table 1).
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the data exclusion criteria removed four participants. The
remaining 17 participants (6 females, 11 males; mean age =
22.1 years, SD = 5.5) had a mean AQ score of 15.5 (SD =
6.6) and a mean total IQ score of 114.5 (SD = 7.7). The TD
group did not differ significantly from the HFA group in
terms of age (t(32) = .675, p = .10), gender ratio (X2(1,
34) = .134, p = .714) or IQ (t(32) = −.54, p = .591). AQ
scores were significantly higher in the HFA group
(t(32) = 5.28, p < .0001).
All HFA and TD participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and provided written consent prior to the
experiment. Participants received course credits or a fee for
taking part. The study was approved by the Ethics Commit-
tee of the Department of Psychology of Hull University.
Materials
The control condition (same identity) involved the same
videos as used in experiment 1, be it that exclusively videosFig. 4 Illustration of the stimulus presentations in experiment 2. Shown are
joy-to-neutral and anger-to-neutral perceptual historiesending at neutral expressions were used. In the identity-
change condition, the identity of the actor changed in-
stantly in the last frame of the sequence (Fig. 4). Both same
gender and different gender changes were included.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as for experiment 1. Fol-
lowing the calibration phase and the practice trials, 128
experimental trials (8 actors × 2 perceptual histories × 2
conditions × 4 repetitions) were presented. The same-
identity and identity-change conditions were presented
in separate blocks (each 64 trials).
Data reduction
Exclusion criteria were the same as for experiment 1. Trials
in which RTs were below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were
removed (HFA, 2.3 %; TD, 5.7 %). Participants were
excluded if more than 25 % of their RT values fell outside
the above range (HFA, n = 0; TD, n = 2) and when theythe same-identity condition and the identity-change condition, for
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= 1; TD, n = 0). The ±2.5 SD rule was applied to the mean
difference of the ratings in the ‘joy’ and ‘anger’ conditions
per participant (HFA, n = 2; TD, n = 2).
Results
The scores in the calibration phase were very similar to
those of experiment 1. Initially, an overall 2 × 2 × 2
ANOVA was performed with task (same identity vs.
identity change) and perceptual history (joy-to-neutral
vs. anger-to-neutral) as within-subject factors, and group
(HFA vs. TD) as between-subjects factor. The main ef-
fect of task was non-significant (F(1, 32) = 1.02, p = .32,
ηp
2 = .031). The main effect of perceptual history was
highly significant (F(1, 32) = 65.9, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .67),
reflecting the overshoot response bias. The main effect
of group was also significant (F(1, 32) = 1.05, p = .010,
ηp
2 = .19), with the HFA group scoring lower (i.e. more
‘anger’ judgments) than the TD group. The task by per-
ceptual history interaction factor was significant (F(1,
32) = 28.9, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .48), while the other two-way
interaction factors were not significant (task by group:
F(1, 32) = 3.8, p = .060, ηp
2 = .106; perceptual history by
group: F(1, 32) = 1.44, p = .24, ηp
2 = .04). The three-way
interaction factor was significant (F(1, 32) = 5.4, p =
.027, ηp
2 = .14). Next, the two tasks were analysed separ-
ately (Fig. 5).
Same-identity task
A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect of per-
ceptual history (F(1, 32) = 70.4, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .68). The
main effect of group was non-significant (F(1, 32) =
3.23, p = .082, ηp
2 = .092), and the perceptual history by
group interaction was non-significant (F(1, 32) = .25, p =
.62, ηp
2 = .008). Thus, the results of the TD and HFA
groups on the same-identity task replicated those of ex-
periment 1, both showing a robust overshoot response
bias.
Identity-change task
The 2 × 2 ANOVA showed significant main effects of both
perceptual history (F(1, 32) = 11.17, p = .002, ηp
2 = .259)
and group (F(1, 32) = 10.02, p = .003, ηp
2 = .239). Crucially,
the perceptual history by group interaction was significant
(F(1, 32) = 8.70, p = .006, ηp
2 = .214). In the TD group, the
ratings for the neutral expressions did not differ between
the two perceptual histories (t(16) = .437, p = .67). Thus, in
TD participants, a change of identity of the actor effectively
removed the overshoot bias. In the AS group, however, the
overshoot bias persisted (t(16) = 3.52, p = .003). While in
the same-identity condition the two groups performed al-
most identically, in the identity-change condition the
groups differed significantly, with the HFA group, but not
the TD group, showing an overshoot response bias. Thiswas also clearly apparent when the results are shown for
each actor separately (Fig. 5b).
Could impaired identity recognition skills in the HFA group
explain their overshoot bias in the identity-change
condition?
In principle, the overshoot bias found in the identity-
change condition in HFA individuals might have resulted
from impaired identity recognition skills [49]. Even though
from debriefing HFA participants it emerged that they all
had spotted the identity change, we could not be sure that
this was the case in each and every trial. If the HFA partici-
pants had not detected the identity change in some of the
trials, then they would have treated these trials as if they
were same-identity trials. We reasoned that if this was the
case, then more overshoot was expected in trials where the
two identities had the same gender, compared to trials with
a gender shift. In terms of physical features, a male and a
female face would look more dissimilar than two male or
two female faces. Therefore, in a subsequent analysis of the
HFA data, the same gender and different gender conditions
were separated. In both the same gender and different gen-
der conditions, the mean scores in the joy-to-neutral and
anger-to-neutral videos differed significantly from each
other (both ps < .005; paired samples t tests, see Fig. 6).
The mean difference scores [i.e. the mean score in anger-
to-neutral videos minus the mean score in joy-to-neutral
videos] in the trials with and without a gender switch did
not differ (t(16) = 1.23, p = .237). This suggests that poorer
identity recognition skills did not play a role in bringing
about the overshoot bias in the identity-change condition
in the HFA group.
Discussion
When the video clips contained no change in identity,
both HFA and TD individuals produced a robust over-
shoot response bias, confirming the results of experiment
1. However, following the identity-change manipulation,
the overshoot bias persisted in the HFA group but was
absent in the TD group. Separate analysis of same gender
and different gender trials in the identity-change condition
suggested that this most probably could not be explained
by impaired identity recognition in the HFA group.
Whereas the results of the same-identity condition might
suggest that HFA individuals show emotional anticipation,
similar to TD individuals, the results of the identity-change
condition show that this is probably not the case. Emo-
tional anticipation would not produce an overshoot bias in
response to a new agent B the observer knows nothing
about (i.e. no perceptual history), other than that agent B
depicts a neutral expression. These findings open up the
possibility that the HFA group relied on an alternative
mechanism or strategy to produce the bias in the same-
identity condition and that the same mechanism/strategy
Fig. 5 Results of experiment 2. a Scores for the neutral expressions at the end of the joy-to-neutral and anger-to-neutral sequences in the same-identity
(left side) and identity-change (right side) conditions in HFA and TD individuals. Error bars indicate SEM. b Ratings for each of the eight actors in the
same-identity (left side) and identity-change (right side) conditions are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors in HFA and TD individuals
Palumbo et al. Molecular Autism  (2015) 6:47 Page 10 of 17was applied in the identity-change condition, hence their
bias in the latter condition.
One possibility is that the HFA group might have been
influenced by the contrast in facial expressions between
the 100 % emotional expression shown at the start ofthe clip and the neutral expression shown at the end of
the clip (both presented for 300 ms). RM [39, 50], in-
volving an extrapolation of the dynamic geometries in
the face or an extrapolation on an underlying positive–
negative valence dimension, forms in principle another
Fig. 6 The effect of gender switch in experiment 2. Scores for the
neutral expressions at the end of the joy-to-neutral and anger-to-
neutral sequences are shown in the identity-change condition with the
same gender change and different gender change in HFA individuals
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valence dimension and to a large extent also the ex-
trapolation of the dynamic geometries of the face remain
unaffected by an identity change.
The absence of an overshoot bias in the TD group in the
identity-change condition confirmed the findings reported
in [32]. It suggests that the robust overshoot in the same-
identity condition was not produced by sequential contrast
effects or RM, because if TD participants relied on these
low-level, bottom-up processes, then they should also have
been affected by them in the identity-change condition.
This finding favours a top-down emotional anticipation
explanation for the TD group.
Experiment 3
In experiment 3, the video sequence was modified such that
it started from a neutral expression and morphed via a
maximally happy or angry expression back to the same
neutral expression (loop condition). The loop task was
designed to shed light on the merits of RM [33, 39] and
contrast effects [34–36] as an explanation for the overshoot
response bias in the HFA group. The rational was that if
the response bias found in the previous experiments in
HFA individuals was induced by the contrast between the
to-be-evaluated last neutral expression (presented for 300
ms) and the ‘anchor’ stimulus (the first happy or angry
expression, also presented for 300 ms), then in the loop
condition, one would expect this last neutral expression to
be evaluated as neutral and not to obtain an overshoot bias.Alternatively, RM would predict to find an overshoot
response bias in the loop condition, i.e. an extrapolation of
the second half of the sequence that went from maximal
joy/anger to neutral. In the study by Palumbo and Jellema
[32], the TD group produced an ‘undershoot’ effect in the
loop condition, consisting of a bias in the direction of the
immediately preceding emotion (i.e. a bias towards happy
in the neutral-to-happy-to neutral condition and a bias to-
wards angry in the neutral-to-angry-to-neutral condition).Methods
Participants
HFA group Eighteen individuals with HFA took part, of
which three were removed following the application of
data exclusion criteria (see ‘Data reduction’ below). The
remaining 15 individuals (5 females, 10 males; mean age =
22.3 years, SD = 7.1) had a mean total ADOS score of 8.2
(SD = 1.6), a mean AQ score of 33.7 (SD = 5.7) and a
mean total IQ score of 118.9 (SD = 8.9; WAIS-III;
Table 1).TD group Twenty-two TD individuals took part. Applying
the data exclusion criteria removed three participants. The
remaining 19 individuals (6 females, 13 males; mean age =
20.6 years, SD = 2.52) had a mean AQ score of 14.7 (SD =
6.1) and a mean total IQ score of 115.1 (SD = 8.1).
The TD group did not differ from the HFA group in
terms of age (t(32) = 1.00, p = .323), gender ratio (X2(1,
34) = .012, p = .914) or IQ (t(32) = 1.49, p = .147). AQ
scores were significantly higher in the HFA group (t(32) =
9.29, p < .0001).
All HFA and TD participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and provided written consent prior to the
experiment. Participants received course credits or a fee for
taking part. The study was approved by the Ethics Commit-
tee of the Department of Psychology of Hull University.Materials
Video clips displayed a neutral expression, which morphed
via a maximally happy or angry expression back to the
same neutral expression. The morphing sequence consisted
of 19 interpolated frames, each 30 ms long. The first and
the last frames both lasted 300 ms, making the entire
sequence last for 1170 ms. The control condition (no loop)
consisted of joy-to-neutral and anger-to-neutral video se-
quences (Fig. 7).Procedure
Following the calibration and the practice trials as in the
previous experiments, participants were presented with 96
randomized trials: 8 actors × 2 perceptual histories × 2 con-
ditions × 3 repetitions.
Fig. 7 Illustration of the stimulus presentations in experiment 3. Top panel: Joy-to-neutral sequence in the control condition (top row) and
neutral-to-joy-to-neutral sequence in the loop condition (bottom row). Bottom panel: Similar sequences but for anger-to-neutral (top row) and
neutral-to-anger-to-neutral (bottom row)
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Trials in which RTs were below 250 ms or above 3000 ms
were removed (HFA, 9.2 %; TD, 7.6 %). Participants were
excluded if more than 25 % of their RT values fell outside
this range (HFA, n = 0; TD, n = 2) and for pressing the
same key more than 90 % of trials (HFA, n = 1; TD, n = 0).
A ±2.5 SD rule was applied to the mean difference of the
ratings in the ‘joy’ and ‘anger’ conditions per participant
(HFA, n = 2; TD, n = 1).
Results
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was performed with task (no loop
vs. loop) and perceptual history (joy-to-neutral vs.
anger-to-neutral) as within-subject factors, and group
(TD vs. HFA) as between-subjects factor. The main ef-
fect of task was non-significant (F(1, 32) = .038, p = .85,
ηp
2 = .001). The main effect of perceptual history was
also non-significant (F(1, 32) = .042, p = .84, ηp
2 = .001).
The latter was surprising as so far the main effect ofperceptual history had always been highly significant. It
reflected that in the loop task, the pattern of scores was
effectively the opposite of that in the no-loop task
(Fig. 8). The main effect of group was non-significant
(F(1, 32) = 1.4, p = .24, ηp
2 = .042). Of the two-way inter-
action factors, the task by perceptual history interaction
was significant (F(1, 32) = 35.1, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .52),
reflecting the pattern reversal between the two tasks.
The other two-way interaction factors were non-significant
(task by group: F(1, 32) = .932, p = .34, ηp
2 = .028; perceptual
history by group: F(1, 32) = 2.08, p = .16, ηp
2 = .061). The
three-way interaction was non-significant (F(1, 32) =
1.23, p = .28, ηp
2 = .037). Even though there was no sig-
nificant three-way interaction, we analysed the group
differences further in the loop and no-loop conditions
for purely explorative purposes using t tests (with α
set at .0125 to correct for multiple comparisons). This
explorative analysis suggested that in the loop task,
the ‘undershoot’ bias in the HFA group did not reach
Fig. 8 Results of experiment 3. a Scores for the neutral expressions at the end of the joy-to-neutral and anger-to-neutral sequences in the
no-loop (left side) and loop (right side) conditions for the HFA and TD groups. Error bars indicate SEM. b Ratings for each of the eight actors in the
no-loop and loop conditions are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors for the HFA and TD groups
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group, it did (t(18) = 2.97, p = .008).
Discussion
In the control condition (no loop), the HFA and TD
groups showed a very similar overshoot response bias,
confirming the results of experiments 1 and 2. In the loop
task, both the TD and HFA groups showed the reversed
pattern, i.e. a tendency towards an undershoot responsebias: the last frame of the neutral-to-joy-to-neutral se-
quence was evaluated as ‘slightly happy’ and the last frame
of the neutral-to-anger-to-neutral sequence as slightly
angry. This confirmed previous findings in [32].
In neither group, an overshoot bias was found in the
loop task, suggesting that RM was not the underpinning
mechanism for either group. The sequential contrast hy-
pothesis predicted that the last frame would be evaluated
as neutral, as the first and last frames were identical
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sponse in both groups renders a major contribution of
sequential contrast unlikely. However, the explorative ana-
lysis suggested that the undershoot bias in the HFA group
was rather weak; its reliability will have to be determined by
further testing. An absence of a bias in the loop condition
in the HFA group might suggest that their responses were
determined by sequential contrast effects, which would
open up the possibility that their overshoot biases in the
control condition were also induced by sequential contrast
effects, rather than by emotional anticipation.
A possible explanation for the undershoot response in
the TD group is that the neutral-joy-neutral sequence
conveyed a positive social signal directed towards the
observer (a brief smile, as used e.g. when colleagues
acknowledge each other while passing in the corridor).
Similarly, the neutral-anger-neutral sequence could con-
vey a negative social signal. This induced in the observer
the impression that the agent either liked or disliked them,
and, as we tend to like those who like us and dislike those
who dislike us [51], the agent was evaluated accordingly.
It is important to note that susceptibility to the ‘social sig-
nal’ does not necessarily imply that the observer is capable
of ‘emotional anticipation’.
General discussion
The current study examined whether individuals with HFA
show similar or dissimilar biases to TD individuals in their
evaluations of dynamic facial expressions, and whether the
mechanisms they rely on in making these evaluations might
be any different from those of TD individuals. Palumbo and
Jellema [32] suggested that the dynamic perceptual history
preceding a neutral target face gives rise to an involuntary
anticipation of how the emotional state of the agent would
change next, called ‘emotional anticipation’, which in turn
biases the perception of that neutral face [32]. These pro-
cesses can be conceptualized as low-level emotion reading
[8, 52], rather than as resulting from low-level visual pro-
cesses (bottom-up).
In experiment 1, both HFA and TD participants showed
a robust overshoot response bias with the last neutral
expression of the joy-to-neutral videos evaluated as slightly
angry and the identical last neutral expression of the anger-
to-neutral videos as slightly happy. Contrary to the initial
prediction, the extent of overshoot bias in HFA individuals
did not differ from that in TD individuals. This finding
suggested that the individuals with HFA were not im-
paired in emotional anticipation or, alternatively, that
they were impaired in emotional anticipation but re-
lied on other (compensatory) mechanisms. Experiment
2 showed that in the TD group, a change in the iden-
tity of the agent during the video clips removed the
overshoot bias, confirming the findings in Palumbo
and Jellema [32]. These results are compatible withtop-down emotional anticipation, involving the inte-
gration of emotion and identity information available
in the immediate perceptual history. Remarkably, the
HFA group continued to show an overshoot bias, simi-
lar to their bias in experiment 1, which could not be
ascribed to a failure to detect the change in identity. It
is possible that the individuals with HFA failed to
implicitly integrate the information about the identity
with the information about the emotional expression.
Experiment 3 further tested whether RM and contrast
effects might have been responsible for the generation
of the response bias in the HFA group by using video
sequences that started and ended with the same neu-
tral expression (loop condition). The responses of the
HFA and TD participants did not differ in this condi-
tion, though subsequent explorative analyses sug-
gested that the undershoot bias in the HFA group may
be weaker than in the TD group, which would be com-
patible with the notion that in the HFA group, sequen-
tial contrast effects played a role. The ‘undershoot’
bias found in the TD group might reflect that the ‘eco-
logically valid’ brief smiles and frowns were seen as
positive and negative signals directed at them, which
made them evaluate the agent in a reciprocal manner.
Emotional anticipation and alternative mechanisms
The notion that anticipation (or expectation) forms an inte-
gral part of perception and acts to shape perception is
widely supported [53]. Especially when the anticipations are
implicit or tacit, they can drive the perception of the
current stimulus into the shape or direction the stimulus is
expected to adopt in the immediate future and thereby dis-
tort the perception of the current stimulus [54, 55]. The
emotional expressivity of a face, especially when it is em-
bedded in a dynamic sequence, may automatically lead to
an anticipation of what the agent’s emotional state most
likely will be in the immediate future, possibly via a low-
level mind-reading process underpinned by motor simula-
tion involving mirror neuron mechanisms (MNM) [8],
which then in turn affects perception. There is accumulat-
ing evidence that the MNM in the premotor cortex be-
comes activated not only when observing other’s bodily
actions but also when observing other’s emotional facial ex-
pressions [18–21]. It has been suggested that such a motor
simulation might underlie the tacit/intuitive understanding
of others’ facial expressions [23], which in turn might shape
the perception of those expressions. In this view, MNM ac-
tivity is part of a low-level mind-reading mechanism [8, 52],
not involving any cognitive inferential processes or deliber-
ate reasoning, which enables emotional anticipation.
What mechanism could have driven the response bias in
the HFA group in the identity-change condition? It is pos-
sible that in the HFA individuals a motor simulation of the
observed dynamic expressions took place, which caused
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happened in the TD individuals. However, this motor simu-
lation may not have been guided properly by identity infor-
mation and therefore was applied indiscriminately, giving
rise to a bias in perceptual report also in the identity-
change condition. There are conflicting reports as to
whether motor simulation is impaired in HFA [30]. Alter-
natively, it is possible that atypical means were employed as
compensation for a failure in automatic emotional anticipa-
tion. It is well documented that individuals with HFA may
adopt systemizing mechanisms (e.g. based on statistical re-
gularities or input-operation-output relations), which typic-
ally govern the motions of non-agentive objects, to
understand and anticipate others’ behaviour [56–59]. One
such atypical approach may be a reliance on the low-level
visual characteristic of the sequential contrast between the
first and last frames, which were both well perceived as they
were presented for 300 ms. Sequential contrast effects
would predict an overshoot response in the identity-change
task, as these effects are immune to identity. In principle,
reliance on RM could form another atypical means result-
ing in perceptual biases. Although the presence of an over-
shoot response in the identity-change task is compatible
with the notion of RM, the absence of an overshoot bias in
the loop task seems to exclude this possibility.
It cannot be excluded though that the evaluations in
the HFA group in the loop task were influenced by an
altogether different mechanism, namely sensitivity to the
pattern present in the video sequence. HFA individuals
might be tuned to detecting specific sequences of
changes in the stimuli and expect the pattern to repeat
itself, in line with the notion that individuals with HFA
are preferentially tuned to detect statistical regularities
and contingencies [56]. Such a ‘pattern detection and ex-
trapolation’ hypothesis would predict the loop to repeat
itself, resulting in an undershoot bias. Subsequent exper-
iments are required to examine the merits of the ‘se-
quential contrast’ and ‘pattern extrapolation’ hypotheses
further in the HFA group.
Could the atypical behaviour of the HFA group have
been caused by one or more (visual) difficulties charac-
teristic for this neurodevelopmental disorder? The find-
ing that the TD and HFA groups performed very
similarly in experiment 1, and in the control conditions
of experiments 2 and 3, with equally sized overshoot re-
sponse biases, speaks against a contribution of such fac-
tors to the judgements. Possible impairments in visual
attention and visual working memory [12], in visual per-
ception of coherent motion [60] and in global processing
[61] are therefore all unlikely contributors. Recognition
of emotional facial expressions may be impaired in HFA,
but recognition of prototypical happy and angry expres-
sions is intact [62]. This is supported by the finding of
very similar scores in the TD and HFA groups in thecalibration phase at the start of the experiments, which
also excludes the possibility that the HFA individuals
might have been impaired in distinguishing between
faint facial expressions of joy and anger [63].
Future studies could, in addition to investigate the role
played by sensitivity to the pattern present in the video
sequence in bringing about the perceptual distortions in
the HFA group, also further examine the role of motor
simulation in bringing about the perceptual distortions.
This could be done, for example, by disrupting activity in
(premotor) mirror mechanisms using transcranial magnetic
stimulation. Furthermore, it would be useful to examine
whether individuals with ASD having more severe symp-
toms than those with HFA might be even more prone to
apply alternative strategies to try and make sense of other
people’s emotional states from social cues.Conclusions
TD individuals are equipped with an automatic and
mandatory mechanism, which allows them to implicitly
anticipate how the emotional state of others may change
on the basis of the immediate perceptual history. The
current findings suggested that individuals with HFA may
not rely on such an emotional anticipation mechanism, but
may use alternative mechanisms.
Emotional anticipation may be underpinned by motor
simulation. However, whether or not motor simulation is
compromised in ASD is still debated [30, 64]. A compro-
mised implicit and automatic anticipation mechanism
would undoubtedly contribute to problems in navigating
the social world, which characterize HFA.
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